



(REVIEW ARTICLE)



The securitization theory

Titilayo Aishat Otukoya *

Independent Researcher, United States of America.

International Journal of Science and Research Archive, 2024, 11(01), 1747–1755

Publication history: Received on 27 December 2023; revised on 07 February 2024; accepted on 09 February 2024

Article DOI: <https://doi.org/10.30574/ijrsra.2024.11.1.0225>

Abstract

Securitization theory provides a powerful lens for understanding how seemingly ordinary issues can be transformed into urgent security threats, demanding extraordinary measures. This paper, focusing on the War on Terror as a case study, examines the theory's strengths and limitations in illuminating this complex phenomenon. Drawing on the Copenhagen School's framework of speech acts, securitizing moves, and desecuritization, we analyze how terrorism has been discursively constructed as an existential threat to international security, justifying exceptional measures with significant geopolitical, policy, and human rights consequences. The War on Terror exemplifies the strengths of securitization theory in demonstrating how securitized narratives can reshape political landscapes and empower governments to enact far-reaching security measures. However, the case study also exposes the theory's limitations, particularly its potential for over-securitization, the marginalization of non-state actors, and the erosion of individual liberties. Engaging with critiques from critical and feminist approaches, we explore these shortcomings and the ongoing debates surrounding the theory's adaptability to address contemporary challenges like balancing security with human rights and navigating non-state threats. The paper concludes by arguing that while securitization theory, particularly the Copenhagen School framework, requires significant adaptation to remain relevant in the 21st century, it still offers valuable insights into the construction of security threats and the dynamics of contemporary security landscapes. By acknowledging its limitations and fostering ongoing dialogue, securitization theory can retain its valuable role in guiding our understanding of complex security challenges and their consequences for individuals, states, and the international community as a whole.

Keywords: Terrorism; International security; Geopolitical consequences; Policy changes; Individual liberties; speech acts; Securitizing moves; Security referent object; Securitization spiral; Audience reception; Debates and challenges; Adapting to non-state threats; Balancing security and freedom; Gendered biases

1. Introduction

The world faces a diverse and ever-evolving array of threats, from pandemics and climate change to cyberattacks and economic instability. Traditional security studies, focused on military threats and nation-states, struggle to fully grasp these complex vulnerabilities. In response, securitization theory emerges as a powerful tool, offering a dynamic and critical lens to navigate this shifting landscape (Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, 1998)

At its core, securitization examines how ordinary issues transform into existential threats. It's like flipping a switch: a flood, a disease outbreak, or even an economic crisis, when deemed a dire threat to a valued "referent object" – be it a community, a way of life, or even humanity itself – triggers extraordinary measures beyond normal routines. This process, as explored by Wæver, bears striking similarities to how military forces respond to enemy threats (Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, 1998).

* Corresponding author: Titilayo Otukoya; Email: titilayootukoya@gmail.com

Securitization theory's strength lies in its expansive scope. It moves beyond the state-centric focus of traditional security studies to encompass the anxieties of a globalized world. This allows us to analyze non-state actors like terrorist groups, transnational threats like cyberwarfare, and even seemingly non-security issues like environmental degradation or health epidemics. By understanding how these diverse anxieties become securitized, we gain valuable insights into how societies respond to critical challenges (Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, 1998).

In today's complex world, securitization theory's relevance is undeniable. It allows us to see beyond the surface of threats, deconstruct how they are constructed, and analyze the power dynamics at play. This critical lens equips academics, policymakers, and citizens alike to navigate the complexities of contemporary security with more nuance and understanding Balzacq (2011).

However, securitization theory is not without its critiques. Oversimplification, overly broad application, and neglect of certain perspectives are valid concerns. Yet, despite these limitations, the theory's ability to illuminate a wide range of contemporary security challenges remains invaluable.

This paper further examines securitization theory through the lens of the War on Terror, a case study that both showcases its strengths and exposes its limitations. It argues that while the theory offers valuable insights into threat construction and political shifts, significant adaptation is required to address the challenges of the 21st century. This adaptation demands a focus on non-state threats, balancing security with human rights, promoting inclusivity in securitization processes, and developing effective mechanisms for de-escalation and desecuritization.

By critically engaging with securitization theory and pushing its boundaries, we can better understand and respond to the diverse and evolving threats that shape our world.

2. Theoretical foundations

2.1. The Copenhagen School (CS)

Emerging from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute in 1985, the Copenhagen School of Security Studies challenged traditional views with its unique blend of realism and social constructivism. Led by figures like Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, they argued that security isn't fixed - it's a performance, woven through language and social interaction (Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, 1998).

Unlike Realists fixated on war and survival, the Copenhagen School saw security as an "act" orchestrated through "securitizing moves." These moves involve actors, from states to individuals, framing an issue as a dire threat, requiring exceptional measures. Success hinges on convincing an audience - a dance between actor and audience determines the threat's urgency and perceived existence (Wæver 1995).

This broadened the security agenda beyond military battles. Their "sectors of security" concept recognized that threats could lurk in the political, economic, societal, and even environmental realms. When deemed existential, these diverse issues could warrant extraordinary responses, reshaping global priorities.

The Copenhagen School also focused on regional dynamics. Through "regional security complexes," they analyzed how states within a region interact, shaping shared perceptions of threats and potentially securitizing certain issues within that specific context (Bigo, 2002).

Though considered the "first generation" of securitization theory, the Copenhagen School remains vibrant and evolving. Their emphasis on language and social construction opened new doors for understanding how security is created and contested in today's interconnected world (Huysmans, 2002).

2.1.1. *Speech Act Theory*

In the realm of international security, the Copenhagen School, spearheaded by scholars like Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, has ignited a revolutionary fire. Their theory of securitization challenges the traditional understanding of security as a tangible threat, instead positing it as a performative act. It's not just about what exists, but how we talk about it. Enter the concept of speech acts, borrowing heavily from J.L. Austin's philosophy of language (Huysmans, 2000).

Ole Wæver, a key figure in the school, eloquently captured the essence of this paradigm shift: "What really makes something a security problem?" he asked, highlighting the limitations of traditional analyses. His answer lies in the transformative power of language. By uttering "security," Wæver argues, we elevate an issue beyond mere concern to a matter of existential threat, justifying extraordinary measures. Think of it as a performative act, like a declaration of war or a marriage vow – the act itself changes the game (Wæver, 1995).

Imagine a state official declaring a specific development a "security threat." This potent utterance, akin to naming a ship, establishes a new reality. It grants the state a special right to wield extraordinary means, bypassing normal political processes. The Cold War, Wæver illustrates, serves as a chilling example. "Order" became synonymous with the survival of the system and its elites. Challenging this order, even discussing change, risked triggering a "securitization" response, unleashing the full force of the state against those deemed to threaten the established order.

This linguistic power play has profound implications. It forces us to recognize two crucial realities:

The Word is the Act

The utterance "security" itself is the primary reality, not some objective threat lurking in the shadows. By speaking it, we create a new reality, legitimizing extraordinary actions. (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde, 1998)

The Power of De-Securitization

The most radical act, paradoxically, can be one of minimizing security. Think of the European détente policies – they aimed to narrow the scope of what constituted a security threat, thereby reducing the potential for extraordinary interventions (Bigo, 2002).

But the story doesn't end there. Eastern Europe in 1989 demonstrated a new twist in this linguistic dance. The protesters sought to "fail" the speech act of security, to expose its emptiness and delegitimize its power. They challenged the claim that any threat to the established order was an existential one, thereby dismantling the justification for extraordinary measures.

This journey through the Copenhagen School's lens reveals a fascinating truth: security is not just a state of being, but a performative act. The words we choose, the labels we apply, hold immense power to shape our reality and legitimize extraordinary actions. By understanding this linguistic power play, we gain a deeper understanding of how threats are constructed, how political agendas are shaped, and how, ultimately, we can challenge the very notion of security itself.

2.1.2. *The Copenhagen School and Desecuritization: A Two-Way Street*

The Copenhagen School's securitization theory, with its focus on how threats are constructed through "moves," offers a powerful lens for understanding security landscapes. However, it initially focused heavily on the act of securitization itself, leaving the return to "normal" politics underexplored. This is where desecuritization steps in, acting as the crucial missing piece in the Copenhagen School's puzzle.

Desecuritization flips the script. It shows how "securitized" issues can be "unmade" and brought back into the realm of ordinary politics. It sheds light on the dynamics that counter exceptional measures and reassert the role of dialogue and compromise. By studying desecuritization, we gain insight into processes that challenge securitized claims, such as exposing factual inaccuracies, highlighting alternative interpretations, or simply allowing anxieties to fade (Balzacq 2011).

Desecuritization also broadens the Copenhagen School's scope. While the School often focuses on state actors making "securitizing moves," desecuritization draws attention to the agency of diverse actors in contesting these narratives. Civil society groups, marginalized communities, and even other states can play a role in desecuritizing issues, challenging the power dynamics embedded within securitized discourses.

However, desecuritization faces challenges. Lingering anxieties can complicate the return to normalcy, and actors benefiting from the status quo may resist efforts to "un-securitize." Constructing a compelling desecuritizing narrative that effectively replaces the existing securitized discourse is also no easy feat.

Ultimately, desecuritization adds a crucial layer to the Copenhagen School's framework. By understanding both securitization and its reversal, we gain a richer appreciation for the fluidity and contestability of security narratives. This allows for a more nuanced and comprehensive approach to security studies, recognizing not just how threats are

constructed, but also how they can be deconstructed and challenged, paving the way for more inclusive and sustainable approaches to security challenges.

By integrating desecuritization, the Copenhagen School's framework evolves from a one-way street into a two-way path, offering a deeper understanding of the complex dance between security and politics in our ever-changing world.

2.2. The critical approach theory

There's a diverse group of proponents associated with the critical approach to securitization theory, reflecting the multiple strands of critique within this broad category. These voices have attacked both the securitizing actors and the power of the securitizing actors designated in the deviation from the traditional sense of security.

The securitizing actor is that who puts forward a claim to securitize an issue. The CS explains that the successful securitization of a referent object will depend on the intersubjective agreement among the subjects as to whether the claim made by the actor is legitimate or not. They argue that "no one is excluded from attempts to articulate alternative interpretations of security," but as a result of the power structures within the field of security, certain actors, typically state elites, hold an advantaged position over defining security threats (Buzan et al, 1998, 31-32; Catherine Charrett 2009). Wæver states that "by definition, something is a security problem when the elites declare it so" (Wæver 1995)

Critical analysts of security argue that the statist field of security has led to securitization processes that exclude certain groups and ideas resulting in negative consequences for the individual or the global community (Catherine Charrett 2009, 24). The Cold War arms race, often invoked as a stark reminder of the dangers of neglecting alternative security priorities, demonstrates how a narrow focus on military power can have devastating consequences. Under the guise of national security, major powers like the US and USSR prioritized weapon stockpiles and backing foreign conflicts, leading to political repression, destructive civil wars, and a crippling neglect of fundamental needs like food security and environmental sustainability, jeopardizing the very foundations of national security itself. (Cheesman 2005; Charrett 2009).

Instead of accepting elite definitions of security threats, a critical approach challenges them. It does this by exposing how powerful groups control security policy and giving analysts the tools to find alternative viewpoints. This means looking for voices often ignored and arguments that contradict the dominant narrative. (Charrett 2009). Once securitization theory is dislodged from its narrow focus on state elites it can actively fulfill its potential to locate securitizing actors at the sub- and supra-state level, as well as other alternative approaches to security such as those expressed by minorities, women, and civil society more generally (Charrett 2009).

2.3. The copenhagen school: strengths v. Limitations

For the past two decades, the Copenhagen School's view of securitization has shaken the security studies field. At its core lies a powerful idea: security threats are not objective realities, but social constructs built through discourse and political processes. This has unveiled fresh ways to understand how issues like climate change or economic crises morph into national security concerns.

This "speech act revolution" has also dismantled the traditional, state-centric view of security. The Copenhagen School recognizes the power of diverse actors, from governments to social movements, to frame issues as existential threats and demand exceptional measures. This critique of power dynamics has fueled critical security studies, illuminating how language shapes the very meaning of security. However, the Copenhagen School's spotlight on discourse can sometimes cast a dim shadow on other factors. Focusing solely on speech acts risks overlooking the material realities and structural inequalities that fuel security threats. Can powerful actors truly manipulate language in a vacuum, unconstrained by economic disparities or resource scarcity?

Furthermore, the School's emphasis on "referent objects" and "securitizing actors" often defaults to the state, leaving non-state actors like civil society or international organizations in the margins. This state-centric bias neglects the diverse voices and perspectives that shape the securitization process.

Finally, the concept of "desecuritization" remains somewhat ambiguous. While the idea of removing an issue from the security sphere sounds inherently positive, does it truly pave the way for a more peaceful society, or simply signify a shift in power and the emergence of new threats?

In conclusion, the Copenhagen School's contribution to understanding the social construction of security is undeniable. But to navigate the complexities of contemporary security challenges, we must acknowledge its limitations and

remember that discourse alone cannot tell the whole story. Only by embracing a nuanced perspective that combines the power of language with material realities and diverse actors can we achieve a truly comprehensive understanding of what it means to be secure in today's world.

3. A case study on securitization: the us-Pakistani “war on terror” dance

Khana and Kaunert wrote of the successful securitization of the war on terror following the 9/11 event:

After the terrorist attacks on the US Twin Towers, the Bush administration informed the then-military government of Pervez Musharraf that Pakistan should either work with the US or against it (Abbas 2015). Musharraf later maintained that if Pakistan had not supported the US in the war against terror, “direct military action by a coalition of the United States, India, and Israel against Pakistan was a real possibility” (Abbas 2015). Fearing India’s increasing role in the war against terror, and to consolidate his position, Musharraf’s government decided to become part of the US campaign against terrorism.

In the wake of 9/11, the international scene witnessed a potent securitization phenomenon, with the “war on terror” shaping global security agendas (Romaniuk & Webb, 2015). The extraordinary measures adopted in that situation were the drone strikes targeted at high-profile leaders within Al-Qaeda and Taliban networks. However, this alliance faced challenges after Musharraf’s 2008 resignation. US apprehension regarding Pakistan’s ability and unwavering commitment to combatting militants culminated in President Bush unilaterally authorizing drone strikes within Pakistani territory, marking a significant escalation in bilateral tensions (Bergen & Tiedemann). Some camps have argued that only high-profile leaders within the identified militant groups were eliminated. But there is a camp that argues that thousands of civilian lives were lost in the process. Now apart from the loss of lives, the US invasion – for that is what it was – on Pakistani territory was a dent in Pakistani sovereignty. But of course, the war on Terror has been successfully securitized and so such sovereignty-impugning action did not generate the furor that it otherwise would have. The possibility of a direct military action by a coalition of the United States, India, and Israel against Pakistan was an indication of the requisite reception by an audience of the war on terror as a security issue.

The successful securitization of the “war on terror” had unforeseen consequences in Pakistan, where over 400 drone strikes and an estimated 7,000 casualties marked a profound shift in the battlefield. While facing its own insurgency in the tribal regions, the Pakistani government relied on public support to counter the threat. However, the US drone campaign, intended to eliminate militants, inadvertently undermined both the local securitization process and public trust. This article argues that the drone strikes effectively “Americanized” the war on terror in Pakistan, alienating audiences and hindering the Pakistani government’s own efforts to portray the conflict as a national security issue. (Khana and Kaunert 2023, 4)

4. The fault in securitization’s stars

4.1. Over-securitization

Securitization theory, with its focus on constructing threats through “moves” and “referent objects,” has revolutionized our understanding of security. But its lens, while powerful, can become distorted. Critics warn of over-securitization, where the focus on exceptional measures risks undermining democratic processes and perpetuating power imbalances.

One concern is the potential for securitization to be weaponized by elites, justifying extraordinary measures with limited scrutiny (Buzan, Weaver & De Wilde, 1998). This can stifle dissent and normalize a “securitization spiral” where exceptional measures become permanent, shrinking the space for open dialogue (Bigo, 2002). The erosion of civil liberties often follows, as seen in post-9/11 policies like the Patriot Act, raising concerns about turning citizens into objects of security rather than active participants.

Furthermore, the Copenhagen School’s emphasis on state-centric narratives risks marginalizing non-state actors and communities most affected by securitized policies (Huysmans, 2006). This can lead to the construction of “securitized identities” where certain groups are permanently cast as threats, perpetuating discrimination and hindering conflict resolution.

To avoid these pitfalls, we must critically interrogate securitization claims, questioning urgency, factuality, and potential self-serving motivations. Protecting democratic processes and civil liberties is paramount, ensuring exceptional

measures are truly extraordinary and subject to rigorous oversight. Amplifying diverse voices and seeking alternative solutions, even when anxieties are high, are crucial.

By acknowledging and addressing the potential for over-securitization, we can harness the power of this theory while safeguarding democratic values and individual rights. This is the key to navigating the complex security landscape of our times, seeking solutions that are not only effective but also just and sustainable.

4.2. Gendered Biases in Security Narratives

While securitization theory has opened our eyes to the performative construction of threats, it often suffers from a glaring blind spot: gendered biases. These biases seep into securitization narratives, shaping who is seen as a threat, who enjoys protection, and what constitutes legitimate security concerns. To fully understand and address contemporary security challenges, we must critically unpack these biases and their repercussions.

One key critique is the tendency of securitization to reinforce patriarchal power structures. By focusing on traditional, often state-centric notions of security, this framework overlooks the diverse threats faced by women and marginalized groups, such as gender-based violence, economic insecurity, and environmental degradation (Cockin, 2012). This invisibility perpetuates a gendered division of security, where men are seen as protectors and women as threats or vulnerable objects in need of protection (Slotte, 2008).

Furthermore, securitization narratives often rely on essentialized portrayals of women as either passive victims or hyper-sexualized threats. This can be seen in discourses on "war on terror" where women are depicted as either helpless victims of terrorism or potential security risks due to their assumed ties to extremists (Tickner, 2011). Such portrayals not only erase the diverse experiences of women in conflict zones but also fuel discrimination and violence against them.

The consequences of overlooking gendered biases in securitization are far-reaching. Inadequate responses to threats faced by women, such as intimate partner violence or human trafficking, further endanger their lives and well-being. Additionally, securitized responses to issues like sexual and reproductive health can restrict women's access to essential services and undermine their bodily autonomy (Carpenter, 2015).

Navigating these complexities requires a feminist rethinking of securitization. This demands:

- Centering women's voices and experiences in securitization processes, ensuring their concerns are not erased or marginalized.
- Deconstructing gendered stereotypes embedded in security narratives, challenging assumptions about who is a threat and who needs protection.
- Expanding the scope of security beyond traditional military concerns to encompass threats that disproportionately impact women, such as gender-based violence and economic insecurity.
- Developing gender-aware security policies that prioritize women's safety and empowerment, fostering inclusive and sustainable solutions to complex challenges.

In conclusion, acknowledging and addressing gendered biases in securitization theory is not merely an academic exercise, but a vital step towards a more just and effective approach to security. By centering women's voices, challenging harmful stereotypes, and expanding the scope of security, we can move beyond a flawed "one size fits all" model and ensure that security truly serves the needs of all, not just the privileged few. This is the critical task we face in building a world where everyone, regardless of gender, feels safe and empowered.

4.3. Securitization's Double Bind: Protecting Citizens, Ignoring Rights?

While securitization theory sheds light on how threats are constructed and political landscapes shift, its intense focus on exceptional measures for existential threats often overlooks human rights concerns. This raises serious questions:

- Eroding Liberties: Securitization can legitimize curtailing civil liberties through increased surveillance, restricted freedoms, and even detention without trial. This undermines the very values it aims to protect, as seen in post-9/11 measures like the Patriot Act (Bigo, 2002).
- Dehumanizing the "Other": Securitization narratives can dehumanize certain groups, portraying them as inherent threats to the referent object. This fuels discrimination and violence against targeted communities, as exemplified in the securitization of immigration in some countries (Huysmans, 2006).

4.4. Recalibrating Securitization

The potential for securitization to erode liberties and dehumanize "others" demands a recalibration. We must:

- Embed human rights principles: Integrate legal compliance, transparency, and dialogue with diverse stakeholders into securitization frameworks.
- Promote human security: Expand beyond military concerns to encompass social, economic, and environmental well-being, addressing the root causes of threats and fostering sustainable solutions.

Only by reconciling security with human rights, striking a balance between protecting both referent objects and individual dignity, can we achieve a safer and just world where securitization truly serves its purpose.

4.5. Securitization Theory: Navigating a Complex World

Securitization theory, with its focus on the social construction of threats and the fluidity of referent objects, revolutionized our understanding of security. However, the theory continues to grapple with ongoing debates and challenges in a world increasingly characterized by non-state actors and complex threats.

4.5.1. Key Challenges

- Non-state threats: The Copenhagen School framework often focuses on state-centric narratives, making it difficult to capture the nuances of threats posed by terrorist groups, cybercriminals, or pandemics (Balzacq, 2011). How can we effectively securitize non-state actors without essentializing them or replicating state power dynamics?
- Security vs. freedom: Striking a balance between security and freedom is a constant struggle. Exceptional measures implemented in response to perceived existential threats can easily curtail civil liberties and erode democratic processes (Bigo, 2002). How can we protect citizens while upholding fundamental rights, especially in the context of long-term securitized discourses that can become the "new normal" (Huysmans, 2006)?
- Deconstructing and desecuritizing: While understanding how issues become securitized is crucial, the theory lacks a well-developed framework for analyzing how threats can be "unmade" and issues returned to normal politics (Williams, 2003). This poses a particular challenge for non-state actors and marginalized groups who struggle to challenge hegemonic securitized narratives. How can we empower diverse voices to contest these discourses and advocate for alternative solutions?
- New threats and expanding security: The rise of threats like climate change and environmental degradation compels us to rethink the scope of security beyond traditional military concerns. The Copenhagen School framework, with its focus on referent objects and existential threats, might not fully capture the nuances of these complex, long-term challenges (Buzan et al., 2010). Expanding the concept of security to encompass ecological well-being and social determinants of vulnerability requires significant theoretical and practical adjustments.
- Securitization theory remains a valuable tool for understanding the political dynamics of threat construction and security landscapes. However, to stay relevant in a rapidly changing world, it must actively engage with these ongoing debates and challenges. By adapting to non-state threats, finding the right balance between security and freedom, developing robust frameworks for desecuritization, and expanding the scope of security, securitization can continue to offer valuable insights for navigating the complex security challenges of the 21st century.

5. Conclusion

The War on Terror, a defining story of our time, continues to influence how we think about security. Studying it through the lens of "securitization," a way of understanding how threats are created and dealt with, reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. This knowledge becomes especially important as we face new and changing threats in the 21st century (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006).

The War on Terror shows how powerful "securitized stories" can be. By portraying terrorism as a major danger, leaders justified unusual actions like increased surveillance and military operations. This highlights how securitization can reshape politics and change what we think is acceptable. However, this power can be harmful. It can be used by powerful people to advance their own goals, potentially silencing critics and excluding other voices. This emphasizes the need for careful analysis and strong democratic processes to ensure that securitization benefits everyone, not just a few (Demmers 2012; Williams 2003).

The War on Terror also reveals the limitations of the "Copenhagen School" approach to securitization, which focuses mainly on states. While this approach works well for traditional threats, it struggles to handle the complex and decentralized nature of modern terrorism. This means we need to broaden the scope of securitization to consider a wider range of actors and threats, giving us a more accurate understanding of the complicated security landscape (Huysmans 2006; Williams 2013).

Another lesson from the War on Terror is the danger of the "securitization spiral." The extreme measures taken in response to the "War on Terror" risked becoming the new normal, creating an atmosphere of fear and distrust. This emphasizes the need for ways to "desecuritize" issues, allowing us to return to normal politics when the immediate threat subsides. Otherwise, we risk giving up important freedoms in the name of constant security (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006).

Despite its limitations, securitization theory remains a valuable tool for understanding current security challenges. Its ability to explain how threats are constructed and how security landscapes change is crucial in a world increasingly defined by uncertainty and complexity. To stay relevant, securitization must adapt and evolve. This includes developing a deeper understanding of threats, prioritizing human rights and ethical considerations, promoting open discussion and inclusivity, and creating strong systems for desecuritization (Balzacq 2011; Buzan et al. 2010).

By acknowledging its limitations and embracing constant adaptation, securitization theory can move beyond the shadow of the War on Terror and become a powerful tool for navigating the challenges of the 21st century. Only through continuous evolution can it fulfill its potential to contribute to a safer and fairer world for all.

Compliance with ethical standards

Disclosure of conflict of interest

No conflict of interest to be disclosed.

References

- [1] Abbas, H. (2015). *Pakistan's drift into extremism: Allah, the army, and America's war on terror*. London and New York: Routledge.
- [2] Alamgir Khan & Christian Kaunert (2023). US drone strikes, securitization processes and practices: A case study of Pakistan. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 16(2), 287-304. DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2023.2179571
- [3] B., Weaver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- [4] Baele, S. J., & Jalea, D. (2023). Twenty-five Years of Securitization Theory: A Corpus-based Review. *Political Studies Review*, 21(2), 376-389. DOI: 10.1177/14789299211069499
- [5] Balzacq, D. (2010). Securitization theory: Putting the field on trial. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(4), 695-724.
- [6] Balzacq, D. (2011). Securitization theory: Putting the field on trial. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(4), 695-724.
- [7] Balzacq, D. (2011). The three faces of securitization: Statehood, identity, and class. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 40(3), 279-303.
- [8] Baysal, B. (2020). 20 Years of Securitization: Strengths, Limitations and A New Dual Framework. *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations*, 17(67), 3-20. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26928568>
- [9] Bigo, D. (2002). Security and immigration: Toward a critique of the securitization paradigm. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27(1), 63-92.
- [10] Bigo, D. (2002). Security and immigration: Towards a critique of the securitization paradigm. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27(3), 273-292.
- [11] Buzan, B., Waedekin, O., & Lemaistre, L. (2010). *Security: New editions*. Polity.
- [12] Buzan, B., Weaver, O., & De Wilde, J. (2010). *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- [13] Carpenter, R. (2015). *Security, sex, and surveillance: Governing intimacy under the securitized state*. Routledge.

- [14] Cockin, M. (2012). Securitization and gender: Bringing bodies back in. *International Studies Quarterly*, 56(4), 695-722.
- [15] Demmers, J. (2012). From securitization to securitisation spiral? The politics of fear and counterterrorism in the Netherlands. *European Journal of International Relations*, 18(4), 659-683.
- [16] Filimon, Luiza-Maria. (2016). An overview of the Copenhagen school's approach to security studies: Constructing (in)security through performative power. *The Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies*, 8, 47-72.
- [17] Huysmans, J. (2006). *The politics of insecurity: Fear, migration and exclusion in Western Europe*. Cambridge University Press, 62 -83
- [18] Huysmans, J. (2006). *The politics of insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU*. Routledge
- [19] McDonald, Matt. (2008). *Securitization and the Construction of Security*. *European Journal of International Relations*, 14. DOI: 10.1177/1354066108097553
- [20] Neumann, P. R. (2008). *Trajectories of violence: Radical right terrorism in contemporary North America*. Routledge
- [21] Slotte, L. (2008). *Gendering security: Feminist rearticulations of international relations*. Routledge.
- [22] Tickner, J. A. (2011). *Gender in a world of violence: On security, silence, and survival*. Oxford University Press.
- [23] Wæver, O. (1995). *Securitization and Desecuritization*. New York University Press. (pg. 23)
- [24] Williams, M. C. (2003). *Deconstructing security: Critical approaches to security and international relations*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- [25] Williams, M. C. (2003). Words, images, enemies: Securitization and international politics. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(4), 511-531.
- [26] Williams, M. C. (2013). *Security studies: An introduction*. Routledge.