Evaluating human factors in airport emergency responses: A case study of west and north African Aviation Incidents

Human factors are very important for keeping people safe in emergencies and in aviation. In the past, it was very hard for airports in North and West Africa to respond to emergencies because they didn't have enough resources, or training. We can actually make flying safer by looking at how human factors affected the outcomes of major regional air disasters.
This study assesses the influence of human factors on the efficacy of airport emergency response, concentrating on two case incidents in West and North Africa. It seeks to pinpoint critical human performance factors (training, communication, leadership, infrastructure, and organizational culture) that influenced emergency management and to suggest measures for improving aviation emergency preparedness in the region.
This research employs a qualitative multiple-case study methodology. This study analyzes two major aviation incidents: the 2005 Bellview Airlines crash in Nigeria and the 2010 Afriqiyah Airways crash in Libya, employing document analysis (comprising official accident reports, news archives, and ICAO guidelines) and a human factors analytical framework. Simulated interviews and checklists were employed to assess emergency response actions against international best practices. Thematic coding of the data, utilizing the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), was employed to identify prevalent human factor issues.
The case analyses show that there were serious mistakes made by people during the emergency response. In Nigeria, not enough training and planning caused search-and-rescue to be delayed, communication between agencies to be poor, and coordination to break down. The Libyan response, on the other hand, was better because they acted quickly on the ground and made decisions on the fly, even though some rules were missing. Both cases share common themes, such as the need for regular emergency drills, good communication systems, strong leadership at the scene of the incident, enough infrastructure (like working radar and firefighting gear), and a culture of safety that is proactive. A quantitative human factors analysis (HFACS) of a related African airline accident indicates that unsafe actions and preconditions, such as crew errors and lapses in situational awareness, were the predominant contributing factors, highlighting systemic safety oversight deficiencies in the region.
Conclusion: Human factors had a big impact on how the airport emergency responses turned out in the West and North African incidents that were looked at. Training, communication, and organizational readiness were all lacking, which led to delays and coordination problems that could have been avoided. On the other hand, proactive human performance, when it was present, helped save lives. To make emergency response more effective, the paper suggests making training programs, communication protocols, leadership structures, and safety culture stronger. These results enhance human factors theory by applying it to emergency response situations and provide actionable recommendations for policymakers and airport authorities in Africa and elsewhere. Subsequent research ought to extrapolate these findings to additional regions and adopt human-centric approaches for emergency preparedness.